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





FIG. 3







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


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
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



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
**MONITOR** SVC SVC **SYSTEM SYSTEM ABORT ABORT** SIRQ **IRQ UNDEF UNDEF** IRQ\_ JRQ FIQ FIQ IRQ SIRQ **USER** USER FIG. 12

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




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EXCERTION .	Vaere: eijssa	Corresponding Mode
RESET	0x00	SUPERVISOR MODE
UNDEF	0x04	MONITOR MODE / UNDEF MODE
SWI	0x08	SUPERVISOR MODE / MONITOR MODE
PREFETCH ABORT	0x0C	ABORT MODE / MONITOR MODE
DATA ABORT	0x10	ABORT MODE / MONITOR MODE
IRQ / SIRQ	0x18	IRQ MODE / MONITOR MODE
FIQ	0x1C	FIQ MODE / MONITOR MODE
SMI .	0x20	UNDEF MODE / MONITOR MODE

# FIG. 14

### **MONITOR**

RESET	VM0
UNDEF	VM1
SWI	VM2
PREFETCH ABORT	VM3
DATA ABORT	VM4
IRQ / SIRQ	VM5
FIQ	VM6
SMI	VM7

### **SECURE**

RESET	VS0
UNDEF	VS1
SWI	VS2
PREFETCH ABORT	VS3
DATA ABORT	VS4
IRQ / SIRQ	VS5
FIQ	VS6
SMI	VS7

NON-SECURE


VNS0
VNS1
VNS2
VNS3
VNS4
VNS5
VNS6
VNS7


FIG. 15

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
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
#### CP15 MONITOR TRAP MASK REGISTER






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


FIG. 21


Inventor: WATT et al SN 10/714,519/Sheet 15 of 56 Atty. Dkt.: 550-480

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
																			·
MONITOR	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10 .	R11	R12	R13_MON	R14_MON	PC		CPSR	SPSR_MON
			•														_		
FAST INTERRUPT	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8_FIQ	R9_FIQ	R10_FIQ	R11_FIQ	R12_FIQ	R13_FIQ	R14_FIQ	PC		CPSR	SPSR_FIQ
INTERRUPT	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	R13_IRQ	R14_IRQ	PC		CPSR	SPSR_IRQ
UNDEFINED	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	R13_UND	R14_UND	ЪС		CPSR	SPSR_UND
ABORT	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	K 2 (7 (2) 1) 1		ЪС		SPSR	SPSR_ABT
SUPERVISOR	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	(0)/\S=\$!!\	844 SVC	PC		CPSR	SPSR_SVC
SYSTEM	RO	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	R13	R14	PC		CPSR	
USER	R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	. 88	R9	R10	R11	R12	R13	R14	PC		CPSR	

FIG. 22

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
NON-SECURE OS

NON-SECURE TASKS

S=0

FIG. 25

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


FIG. 27

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


FIG. 28

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


FIG. 29

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



FIG. 30

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



FIG. 32


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INTERRUPT TYPE/PRIORITY	HOW HANDLED	_
1	s	
2	S	
3	NS	·
4	NS/S	NO S ONLY
5	NS	HANDLERS LOWER THAN
6	NS/S	HIGHEST NS
· · 7 · · .	NS	HANDLER
•	•	
• .	•	

FIG. 34



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




FIG. 36

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




FIG. 39


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





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


FIG. 45

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


FIG. 46

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



FIG. 47



2100

Y

2120

S

X+1

X

2110

NS


0


PHYSICAL

ADDRESS SPACE


FIG. 49


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



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




FIG. 54


Inventor: WATT et al SN 10/714,519/Sheet 44 of 56 Atty. Dkt.: 550-480




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HALT	COMPARISONS SUCCEED WITH INSTRUCTION ADDRESS AND/OR CP15 CONTEXT ID ( <sup>2</sup> ) HALT INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN SCANNED IN EDBGRQ INPUT PIN IS ASSERTED	DEBUG TAP	INTERNAL DEBUG REQUEST EXTERNAL DEBUG REQUEST
HALT/MONITOR (1)	PROGRAM WATCHPOINT REGISTER AND/OR CONTEXT-ID REGISTER AND	DEBUG TAP OR SOFTWARE (CP14)	WATCHPOINT HITS
HALT/MONITOR	PROGRAM VECTOR TRAP REGISTER AND ADDRESS MATCHES	DEBUG TAP	VECTOR TRAP BREAKPOINT
		(INSTRUCTION TRANSFER REGISTER) THROUGH DEBUG TAP OR USE BKPT INSTRUCTION DIRECTLY IN THE CODE	INSTRUCTION
HALT/MONITOR	BKPT INSTRUCTION MUST REACH EXECUTION STAGE	PUT A BKPT INSTRUCTION INTO SCAN CHAIN 4	SOFTWARE BREAKPOINT
	COMPARISONS SUCCEED WITH INSTRUCTION ADDRESS AND/OR CP15 CONTEXT ID ( <sup>2</sup> )	-	
HALT/MONITOR (1)	PROGRAM BREAKPOINT REGISTER AND/OR CONTEXT-ID REGISTER AND	DEBUG TAP OR SOFTWARE (CP14)	BREAKPOINT HITS
ENTRY MODE	HOW TO ENTER?	HOW TO PROGRAM?	METHOD OF ENTRY

 $(^2)$ : THE CORES HAVE SUPPORT FOR THREAD-AWARE BREAKPOINTS AND WATCHPOINTS IN ORDER TO ABLE TO ENABLE SECURE DEBUG ON SOME PARTICULAR THREADS. (1): IN MONITOR MODE, BREAKPOINTS AND WATCHPOINTS CANNOT BE DATA-DEPENDENT.


## FIG. 60

		· ·		<u> </u>
NAME	MEANING	RESET	ACCESS	INSERTED IN SCAN CHAIN FOR TEST
MONITOR MODE ENABLE BIT	0: HALT MODE 1: MONITOR MODE	1	R/W BY PROGRAMMING THE ICE BY THE JTAG (SCAN 1)  •R/W BY USING MRC/MCR INSTRUCTION (CP14)	YES
SECURE DEBUG ENABLE BIT	0: DEBUG IN NON-SECURE WORLD ONLY 1: DEBUG IN SECURE WORLD AND NON- SECURE WORLD	0	IN FUNCTIONAL MODE OR DEBUG MONITOR MODE:R/W BY USING MRC/ MCR INSTRUCTION (CP14) (ONLY IN SECURE SUPERVISOR MODE) IN DEBUG HALT MODE: NO ACCESS- MCR/MRC INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY EFFECT (R/W BY PROGRAMMING THE ICE BY THE JTAG (SCAN 1) IF JSDAEN=1	NO
SECURE TRACE ENABLE BIT	0: ETM IS ENABLED IN NON-SECURE WORLD ONLY. 1: ETM IS ENABLED IN SECURE WORLD AND NON- SECURE WORLD	0	IN FUNCTIONAL MODE OR DEBUG MONITOR MODE:R/W BY USING MRC/ MCR INSTRUCTION (CP14) (ONLY IN SECURE SUPERVISOR MODE) IN DEBUG HALT MODE: NO ACCESS- MCR/MRC INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY EFFECT (R/W BY PROGRAMMING THE ICE BY THE JTAG (SCAN 1) IF JSDAEN=1	NO
SECURE USER- MODE ENABLE BIT	0: DEBUG IS NOT POSSIBLE IN SECURE USER MODE 1: DEBUG IS POSSIBLE IN SECURE USER MODE	1	IN FUNCTIONAL MODE OR DEBUG MONITOR MODE:R/W BY USING MRC/ MCR INSTRUCTION (CP14) (ONLY IN SECURE SUPERVISOR MODE) IN DEBUG HALT MODE: NO ACCESS- MCR/MRC INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY EFFECT (R/W BY PROGRAMMING THE ICE BY THE JTAG (SCAN 1) IF JSDAEN=1	NO
SECURE THREAD- AWARE ENABLE BIT	0: DEBUG IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A PARTICULAR THREAD 1: DEBUG IS POSSIBLE FOR A PARTICULAR THREAD	0	IN FUNCTIONAL MODE OR DEBUG MONITOR MODE:R/W BY USING MRC/ MCR INSTRUCTION (CP14) (ONLY IN SECURE SUPERVISOR MODE) IN DEBUG HALT MODE: NO ACCESS- MCR/MRC INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY EFFECT (R/W BY PROGRAMMING THE ICE BY THE JTAG (SCAN 1) IF JSDAEN=1	NO

FIG. 61

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


FIG. 62

SI	SE	СК	Q[n+1]
Х	0		0
Х	0	\ 	1
Х	Х	/	Q[n]

**FUNCTION TABLE** 


D

0

X

Х

0









FIG. 63


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



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


					7
	MEANING	NO INTRUSIVE DEBUG IN ENTIRE WORLD IS POSSIBLE. ANY DEBUG REQUEST, BREAKPOINTS, WATCHPOINTS, AND OTHER MECHANISM TO ENTER DEBUG STATE ARE IGNORED IN ENTIRE SECURE WORLD	DEBUG IN ENTIRE SECURE WORLD IS POSSIBLE	DEBUG IN SECURE USER-MODE ONLY. ANY DEBUG REQUEST, BREAKPOINTS, WATCHPOINTS, AND OTHER MECHANISM TO ENTER DEBUG STATE ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN USER MODE ONLY. (BREAKPOINTS AND WATCHPOINTS LINKED OR NOT TO A THREAD ID ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT). ACCESS IN DEBUG IS RESTRICTED TO WHAT SECURE USER CAN HAVE ACCESS TO.	DEBUG IS POSSIBLE ONLY IN SOME PARTICULAR THREADS. IN THAT CASE ONLY THREAD-AWARE BREAKPOINTS AND WATCHPOINTS LINKED TO A THREAD ID ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO ENTER DEBUG STATE. EACH THREAD CAN MOREOVER DEBUG ITS OWN CODE, AND ONLY ITS OWN CODE.
CP14 BITS IN DEBUG AND STATUS CONTROL REGISTER	SECURE THREAD- AWARE DEBUG ENABLE BIT	×	×	0	-
EBUG AND STATUS	SECURE USER- MODE DEBUG ENABLE BIT	×	0	-	-
CP14 BITS IN DE	SECURE DEBUG ENABLE BIT	0	_	-	-

FIG. 69A

CP14 BITS IN DEBUG AND STATUS CONTROL REGISTER			
SECURE TRACE ENABLE BIT	SECURE USER- MODE DEBUG ENABLE BIT	SECURE THREAD- AWARE DEBUG ENABLE BIT	MEANING
0	Х	×	NO OBSERVABLE DEBUG IN ENTIRE SECURE WORLD IS POSSIBLE. TRACE MODULE (ETM) MUST NOT TRACE INTERNAL CORE ACTIVITY
1	0	х	TRACE IN ENTIRE SECURE WORLD IS POSSIBLE
1	1	0	TRACE IS POSSIBLE WHEN THE CORE IS IN SECURE USER-MODE ONLY
1	1	1	TRACE IS POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE CORE IS EXECUTING SOME PARTICULAR THREADS IN SECURE USER MODE. PARTICULAR HARDWARE MUST BE DEDICATED FOR THIS, OR RE-USE BREAKPOINT REGISTER PAIR: CONTEXT ID MATCH MUST ENABLE TRACE INSTEAD OF ENTERING DEBUG STATE

FIG. 69B



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ENTRY WHEN IN NON-SECURE WORLD	ENTRY WHEN IN SECURE WORLD
NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER	SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER
NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER	SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER
DISABLED FOR NON-SECURE DATA ABORT AND NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT INTERRUPTIONS. FOR OTHER NON-SECURE EXCEPTIONS, PREFETCH ABORT	DISABLED FOR SECURE DATA ABORT AND SECURE PREFETCH ABORT EXCEPTIONS (1). FOR OTHER EXCEPTIONS, SECURE PREFETCH ABORT
NON-SECURE DATA ABORT HANDLER	SECURE DATA ABORT HANDLER
DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE	DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE
DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE	DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE
	NON-SECURE WORLD  NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER  NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER  DISABLED FOR NON-SECURE DATA ABORT AND NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT INTERRUPTIONS. FOR OTHER NON-SECURE EXCEPTIONS, PREFETCH ABORT  NON-SECURE DATA ABORT HANDLER  DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE

<sup>(1)</sup> SEE INFORMATION ON VECTOR TRAP REGISTER

## FIG. 71A

METHOD OF ENTRY	ENTRY IN NON-SECURE WORLD	ENTRY IN SECURE WORLD
BREAKPOINT HITS	NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER	BREAKPOINT IGNORED
SOFTWARE BREAKPOINT INSTRUCTION	NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT HANDLER	INSTRUCTION IGNORED (1)
VECTOR TRAP BREAKPOINT	DISABLED FOR NON-SECURE DATA ABORT AND NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT INTERRUPTIONS. FOR OTHER INTERRUPTION NON-SECURE PREFETCH ABORT	BREAKPOINT IGNORED
WATCHPOINT HITS	NON-SECURE DATA ABORT HANDLER	WATCHPOINT IGNORED
INTERNAL DEBUG REQUEST	DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE	REQUESTIGNORED
EXTERNAL DEBUG REQUEST	DEBUG STATE IN HALT MODE	REQUESTIGNORED
DEBUG RE-ENTRY FROM SYSTEM SPEED ACCESS	NOT APPLICABLE	NGT APPLICABLE

<sup>(1)</sup> AS SUBSTITUTION OF BKPT INSTRUCTION IN SECURE WORLD FROM NON-SECURE WORLD IS NOT POSSIBLE, NON-SECURE ABORT MUST HANDLE THE VIOLATION.

<sup>(2)</sup> NOTE THAT WHEN EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL DEBUG REQUEST IS ASSERTED, THE CORE ENTERS HALT MODE AND NOT MONITOR MODE